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ABSTRACT
The causes and consequences of the Boko Haram insurgency as well as
its possible solutions have been subjected to different interpretations
among scholars, politicians, and journalists. Little is known, however,
about how the Nigerian populace thinks about the uprising. The
present study contributes to the literature on Boko Haram by analyzing
the perceptions of Nigerian students vis-a-vis Boko Haram’s agenda
and the government’s response. The results demonstrate a north–
south divide with Christians or Igbo and Muslims or Hausa-Fulani
holding different ideas on the causes of the crisis, being differently
affected by it, and slightly disagreeing on the desirability of military
government responses. In conclusion, perceptions on Boko Haram lay
bare ethno-religious fault lines reﬂecting existing grievances, thereby
possibly undermining efforts at nation-building and peaceful
coexistence in the multi-ethnic Nigerian society.
On the night of 14 April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped nearly 300 schoolgirls from Chibok
town in the north-east of Nigeria. The abduction shocked not only the Nigerian nation, but
the international community as well. The United Nations Security Council denounced the
kidnapping as a “crime against humanity.”1 Nigeria’s president at the time, Goodluck Jona-
than, was intensively criticized for his handling of the crisis.2 Even Michelle Obama, the U.S.
ﬁrst lady and advocate for women’s rights, condemned the act as “unconscionable” and sup-
ported the social media offensive to “#Bringbackourgirls.”3 Ever since, the crisis has attracted
increased attention and has resulted in an intensiﬁcation of responses. According to the
Global Terrorism Index, Boko Haram—Nigeria’s latest security threat—had overtaken the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 “to become the most deadly terrorist group in
the world.”4
Several scholars have discussed the history and motives of Boko Haram as well as the con-
sequences of and solutions for the crisis.5 Although the movement has earlier roots, it has
come to prominence with the July 2009 uprisings in Borno state, northern Nigeria. Largely,
three main reasons for this outbreak of violence are put forward: religious radicalization and
the quest for a Sharia state, the overall socioeconomic situation in the country and
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particularly the relative deprivation of the northern region, and failed governance coupled
with weak institutions. Furthermore, some studies have criticized that escalatory counterter-
rorism approaches have taken preference to dialogue and conciliatory measures.6 Since the
escalation of violence in 2009 and the following governmental repression, the crisis has led
to tens of thousands of lives lost, massive displacement, and a signiﬁcant drop in economic
activity.7
Notwithstanding these valuable insights on the origins of and solutions for the Boko
Haram crisis, little is known about public perceptions about these explanations and
ongoing military approaches, and about the extent to which public perceptions diverge
or converge across ethnic and religious cleavages. Although both Olaniyan and Asue-
lime8 and Onapajo and Usman9 have suggested that Boko Haram widens Nigeria’s
ethno-religious cleavages, there is still no large-scale empirical study that shows
whether and how Boko Haram has contributed to polarization in Nigerian society. As
a ﬁrst step to addressing this gap, this article analyzes the opinions of Nigerian students
from different ethnic and religious backgrounds on the causes, consequences, and solu-
tions to the insurgency. For this purpose, we analyze recent data from the Corpers’
Survey collected in Nigerian universities in 2015. This student sample provides a
detailed picture of perceptions on Boko Haram among Nigeria’s future societal and
political leaders, but also among a vulnerable group of youngsters susceptible to Boko
Haram’s recruitment efforts. The study clearly exposes a north–south division: percep-
tions on Boko Haram lay bare ethno-religious fault lines reﬂecting long-standing griev-
ances, thereby undermining possible efforts at nation-building and peaceful coexistence
in the multiethnic Nigerian society.
The article proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the rise of Boko
Haram in Nigeria and its recent decline. Next, we highlight our methodological approach
before describing the causes, the consequences, and the government’s responses to the Boko
Haram crisis in the following three sections. Within each of these three sections, we analyze
to what extent student perceptions converge or diverge from the ideas put forward in the lit-
erature. Special attention is paid to differences in opinions between students from different
ethno-religious backgrounds. Finally, we draw some conclusions, point out limitations, and
make suggestions for future research.
The Rise (and fall?) of Boko Haram
Boko Haram identiﬁes itself as a Salaﬁst-jihadi movement that openly opposes secular
authority and actively strives for the implementation of Sharia law in the entirety of
Nigeria.10 Although the exact date of the emergence of Boko Haram is mired in contro-
versy, it is commonly acknowledged that the sect’s11 historical roots can be traced in
the mid-1990s12 in northeastern Nigeria. However, it has especially come to promi-
nence with the July 2009 uprisings in Borno state, in the north of Nigeria, and the fol-
lowing escalation of violence. It is believed that the sect has ﬂourished under diverse
names such as Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra, the Nigerian or Yobe Taliban, and Yusu-
ﬁyyah before it became widely known as Boko Haram. The contested nickname “Boko
Haram,” which is a combination of Hausa and Arabic words, means “western or non-
Islamic education is a sin.”13 The sect, on the other hand, names itself “Jama’atu Ahlis
Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad,” meaning “People Committed to the Propagation of the
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Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” In this way, the group wants to stress that Boko
Haram does not mean “western Education is forbidden” but “western civilization is for-
bidden” and that it should be replaced by the Islamic culture.14
The exact number of Boko Haram members is unknown. While Amnesty International
carefully estimates that the group has at least 15,000 members,15 scholars and journalists
state that the sect could have over 40,000,16 280,000,17 or even 540,00018 members in Nigeria
and neighboring countries such as Niger, Cameroon, and Chad as well as Sudan and Mali.
Although Boko Haram is believed to include some well-educated, wealthy, and inﬂuential
people including former political elites, it recruits mainly from disaffected youths, school
drop-outs, unemployed graduates, and street children (often former Almajiris19) mostly but
not exclusively from northern Nigeria (especially Borno and Yobe states). In addition to vol-
untary members, it is argued that Boko Haram also engages in extensive and radical sermons
including the threat of using violence to recruit members.20
Although it is estimated that Boko Haram is made up of three to six factions,21 it does
seem to have an established organizational structure including a central leader. At the begin-
ning, it was led by commander-in-chief Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic preacher
who died in July 2009 in what has allegedly been an extrajudicial killing by police ofﬁcers.
Immediately after his death, Mallam Sanni Umaru became acting leader. Since then, several
persons have claimed to be chief at various times. Presently, Abubakar Shekau22 is believed
to be the political and spiritual head of the sect, while Mallam Abul Qaqa is its spokesman.23
Civil society organizations and scholars claim that the operations of the sect are largely
funded by daily membership fees (100 naira), but also by donations from politicians, govern-
ment ofﬁcials, and other individuals and (terrorist) organizations within and outside
Nigeria.24 Some of their money is also supposed to come from looting, bank robberies, and
ransoms. This stream of income ﬁnances a large scale of weaponry including cudgels, bows
and arrows, guns, and bombs.25
The sect deploys various tactics including conventional and suicide bomb attacks, hit-
and-run raids on villages, and the capture of larger towns in the north-east of the country.26
In 2014 the violence escalated, leading to almost 7,000 deaths and making it the “most
deadly terrorist group in the world” that year.27 Compared to prior insurgent groups in
Nigeria, Boko Haram seems more sophisticated, stronger linked with foreign actors, and
more controversial in terms of demands and goals.28 However, since he was inaugurated as
Nigeria’s new president in May 2015, Muhammadu Buhari has undertaken a new offensive
with assistance from the armed forces of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The campaign has
succeeded in recapturing major towns in northeastern Nigeria that were hitherto under con-
trol of Boko Haram. But although Buhari announced at the end of 2015 that Boko Haram
was “technically defeated,”29 the militant group has continued to kill civilians through raids
on smaller towns and bomb attacks in 2016.30
Method
This article aims to analyze Nigerian public opinion on the causes and consequences of, and
the responses to, the Boko Haram insurgency. Speciﬁcally, we wonder to what extent public
opinion follows the views outlined in the academic literature and national media. Further-
more, special attention is paid to differences in perceptions between ethno-religious groups.
These research objectives explore the proposition that the impact of the Boko Haram
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insurgency goes beyond the well-reported physical and economic damage: by diverging the
population’s opinion, it is possible that Boko Haram causes a worsening of inter-group
relations.
This study relies on both secondary and primary data sources. The next three sections
investigate the causes, consequences, and preferred government responses with regard to
Boko Haram. For each section, we ﬁrst discuss academic articles and media reports to
represent the views mentioned in these secondary sources. Next, each section is comple-
mented with primary data from a large-scale opinion survey (i.e., the Corpers’ Survey)
conducted in 2015 in Nigerian universities. Large-scale social survey data containing
empirical evidence on opinions vis-a-vis the insurgency is extremely scarce.31 The stu-
dent survey was designed to analyze to what extent the National Youth Service Corps
(NYSC) program contributes to improving inter-group relations and fostering stronger
national identities among its participants, but also contains valuable questions on how
the students perceive the Boko Haram crisis. These questions and their descriptives can
be found in Appendix A. The survey took place in ﬁve major Nigerian universities,32
carefully selected to ensure a proper ethno-regional and religious mix of respondents,
but also guaranteeing the safety of the researchers. Respondents were invited to partici-
pate in a short in-class, paper-and-pencil self-administered questionnaire. In total 6,830
students33 took part in the study (55.9 percent male; 43.7 percent female) with an aver-
age age of 24. More information on the sociodemographic characteristics can be found
in Appendix B. As information on the place of birth, religion, and ethnic group of the
respondents was included in the survey, we could discern differences in opinions vis-
a-vis Boko Haram between various ethno-religious groups by using chi-square tests, t-
tests, and ANOVAs.34 The sections below describe the results of these tests including
corresponding tables at the end of each section (see Tables 1 and 2).
It is important to note that university students are a particular subgroup of the population
in terms of educational level, literacy, ﬁnancial resources, mobility, and access to new tech-
nologies, which obviously prohibits us to generalize our results to the wider Nigerian popula-
tion. Nevertheless, university students are an extremely interesting research population in
itself, because today’s students are tomorrow’s societal and political elites. Moreover, it is
also important to seek the views of students about Boko Haram because the sect recruits pre-
dominantly among young men and women—especially among those who fail to ﬁnd work
after completing higher education.35
Boko Haram: The Causes
Like its origin, the raison d’^etre of the Boko Haram insurgency is controversial because mul-
tiple competing analyses have been used to explain the goals, demands, and causes of the
uprising.36 We divided the different root causes discussed by various authors into three
main explanations: religious fundamentalism and ideology, sustained poverty and unem-
ployment in the northern regions of the country, and bad governance and institutional fra-
gility.37 These structural conditions and grievances combined—while they may not be
sufﬁcient explanations on their own—provide essential insights into the emergence of Boko
Haram when complemented by facilitators, external factors, and particular triggers.38
First and foremost, journalists, scholars, and politicians view the sect as a strictly religious
quagmire given Boko Haram’s public advocacy for the stringent implementation of Sharia
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law in the entire country.39 Religion has always played a vital and inﬂuential role in Nigerian
society regularly manifesting itself as a strong force in the political process.40 Boko Haram
adds to this debate on the place of religion in governance as it explicitly abhors the seculari-
zation and westernization of the government41 and strives for a strict application of Sharia
law as a societal cleanser.42 Therefore, many have argued that Boko Haram is the manifesta-
tion of religious commitment and fundamentalist indoctrination embedded in the contem-
porary global jihadist utopianism of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or ISIS.43 They claim that Boko
Haram is principally waging a war against Christians and non-indigenes in the north as well
as against the un-Islamic and democratic government in order to end Western inﬂuence.44
In this respect, the Nigerian journal, The Guardian, reported that:
[…] the Boko Haram Islamic Sect which had continued to […] kill innocent citizens, particu-
larly Christians, in their bid to turn Nigeria into an Islamic nation. The church noted reports
that Christians were being forced to denounce the name of Jesus Christ and embrace Islam and
those who refused to do so were being killed in cold blood.45
Second, Nigeria’s extreme poverty, unemployment, inequality, economic underdevelopment,
and low education are thought to serve as major sources of grievances harbored by the sect.46 In
particular, there is a vast socioeconomic disparity between the north and other parts of Nigeria.
Based on a report of The National Bureau of Statistics, BBC News reported that the absolute
poverty rates (i.e., number of people who can only afford bare essentials of shelter, food, and
clothing) in the north-west and north-east of the country reached 77.7 percent and 76.3 percent,
respectively, compared to 59.1 percent in the south-west.47 Moreover, the northern region is
confronted with an extremely low level of infrastructural and human capacity development evi-
denced by the low level of education and high level of unemployment, particularly among the
youth. This situation of relative deprivation led BBC African analyst Richard Hamilton to con-
clude that “it is perhaps no surprise that extremist groups, such as Boko Haram, continue to
have an appeal in northern parts of the country, where poverty and underdevelopment are at
their most severe.”48 The provision of welfare, food, and shelter by the antistate, fundamentalist
group could constitute a strong incentive for dissatisﬁed youth. Additionally, the group provides
the opportunity to use violence for looting private and public businesses, and can give youth the
feeling that they are worth something for the ﬁrst time in their lives.49 In this respect, research-
ers also argue that members of Boko Haram are essentially uneducated and jobless youth,
school drop-outs, and students from a low socioeconomic background or with a formal educa-
tion but who failed to ﬁnd work within the current Nigerian situation. In other words, Aghedo
and Osumah conclude that Boko Haram’s membership “relates to the depth feeling about
socioeconomic injustice, marginalization and human insecurity.”50
Third and in a similar vein, various scholars and politicians see the Boko Haram insurgency
as a reaction to the widespread corruption, moral decadence, pervasive inefﬁciency, and general
impunity prevalent among the political upper class.51 Since independence, the leadership of
Nigeria has been seen as fraudulent, wasteful, and insensitive to the genuine needs and aspira-
tions of the constituents despite the country’s immense human and natural resources. This cre-
ated a sphere of general human insecurity breeding discontent among the populace.52
Successive governments have failed to create an inclusive program addressing poverty across all
regions. As a result, people living in the north feel particularly neglected by their government
causing a general sense of injustice in these areas.53 Institutional fragility not only causes griev-
ances, it also facilitates terrorist uprisings by creating an environment where terrorists can easily
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build their sanctuaries. Poor border management, for instance, paves the way for the smuggling
of deadly arms and drugs, and makes it easier for militants to seek shelter in neighboring coun-
tries after their strikes.54 The ill-equipped, weak, and notoriously corrupt security apparatus
was (until recently) largely unable to conduct large-scale antiterror operations—a situation that
also served the rise of Boko Haram.55 Other possible facilitators include demographic factors
such as the immense population density of Nigeria and the presence of a youth bulge that sub-
stantially increased the steady and cheap supply of economically deprived individuals suscepti-
ble for recruitment.56 In addition to these internal facilitators, external factors and foreign
support aid the operations of the sect. The Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the ethno-linguistic ties between
the countries stimulate smuggling and migration.57 Moreover, the sect shares the ideology of
other Islamist movements such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab, or
ISIS. In fact, Boko Haram has stated in the past that it is “a version of al-Qaeda which we align
with and respect”58 and in 2014 Abubakar Shekau has pledged to sympathize with the Middle
Eastern jihadist group ISIS59 and to recognize its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as “Caliph.”60
These jihadi alliances provide ﬁnancial assistance to Boko Haram and help it to train and arm
its militants.61 Some neighboring West-African countries, such as Chad, Cameroon, and Niger,
are also suspected of providing sanctuary for the militants and destabilizing the region. Particu-
larly, the signiﬁcant discovery of oil and gas reserves in the Lake Chad Basin—Boko Haram’s
operational base—is causing turmoil in the region. There are rumors that both internal (such as
Ayo Oritsejafor, president of the Christian Association of Nigeria) and external actors (such as
Nigeria’s neighboring countries) offer ﬁnancial and other logistic support to the growing insur-
gent group(s) in the region in return of a bigger piece of “the oil cake.”62
Perceptions on the Causes of the Boko Haram Insurgency
The Boko Haram insurgency portrays a complex conﬂict for political power and economic
resources in response to the relative deprivation of the north intertwined with the complex
ethno-religious divide in Nigeria. Although Boko Haram is actively engaged in advocacy for
a strict implementation of Sharia law, scholars warn that this conceals the “socio-economic
and political fac¸ade” of the insurgency.63 Thus, even though the driving force behind the ter-
rorist group may seem to be religion, internal inducers are also linked to the political econ-
omy of Nigeria and to the weakness of its state apparatus. The question remains whether the
public opinion (students in this case) holds this nuanced picture as well. Notwithstanding
the argument of scholars that Boko Haram represents economic and political violence in
religious disguise,64 most students (55.5 percent) maintain that religious extremism is the
main reason for the uprising. Only one out of four students (26.7 percent) point to unem-
ployment and poverty as the main reason for the uprising, while a sense of injustice and the
neglect of the northern regions by the government is barely seen as the main reason for the
uprising (5.5 percent).
Interestingly, important differences exist between the different ethno-religious65 and spa-
tial66 groups. Among people born in southern states, a great majority (63.0 percent) believes
that religious beliefs/extremism is the main reason for the Boko Haram insurgency, whereas
almost half of the people from the north (46.6 percent) see unemployment/poverty/lack of
opportunities as the main reason. People from the north are also the only ones who some-
times (9.7 percent) indicate injustice/neglect of the north as the main reason. People born in
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central Nigeria are more divided on the issue as 38.0 percent indicate unemployment as the
main reason, while 44.7 percent think that religious beliefs caused the uprising. These differ-
ences are signiﬁcant: x2(6) D 407.571; p < .001. The north–south division is even more pro-
nounced when looking at the ethnic and religious group of the respondents. Among both
the Hausa-Fulani and Muslims, most people indicate unemployment/poverty as the main
reason of the Boko Haram crisis (respectively 56.4 percent and 56.5 percent) while the
majority of the Igbo’s and Christians see religion as the main reason (respectively 70.7 per-
cent and 66.2 percent). Yoruba respondents are more divided: 43.3 percent point to religion
while one third (32.8 percent) indicate unemployment as the main reason for the uprising.
Furthermore, signiﬁcantly more students from the Hausa-Fulani and Muslim groups men-
tion the neglect of the northern regions by the government as the main reason (12.6 percent
and 11.9 percent) compared to Christians (3.9 percent), Igbo (2.9 percent), or Yoruba (8.0
percent). These differences between the groups are signiﬁcant: x2(9) D 781.563; p < .001 for
the ethnic groups and x2(6) D 1015.456; p < .001 for the religious groups.
Boko Haram: The Consequences
Since its emergence, Boko Haram has been increasingly resorting to violence as a strategy to
achieve its goal.67 Between 2000 and 2009 Boko Haram launched a series of attacks on nation-
wide and international targets such as government buildings and the United Nations House in
Abuja as well as on more local places such as markets, banks, shopping complexes, and
churches. Both public ﬁgures and innocent ordinary citizens were besieged, especially non-indi-
genes and Christians. The attacks—largely bombings—were mainly concentrated in northern
Nigeria.68 The killing of their leader Yusuf in 2009 served as a catalyst for further radicalization
resulting in a full-ﬂedge violent campaign to wrest power from the secular government.69
Since 2009, the death toll has risen yearly, reaching the milestone of at least 20,000 deaths
at the end of 2015. Depending on the estimate,70 the conﬂict cost the lives of some 4,62171
or even 6,66472 people in 2014 alone. It is, however, important to note that Boko Haram and
the government can both be held responsible for those 20,000 lives. Amnesty International
estimates that some 7,000 people have died of starvation, suffocation, or torture while being
held in military detention since March 2011 and at least 1,200 men and boys are believed to
have been executed by the military since February 2012.73 Furthermore, more than one
Table 1. Main reason for the uprising according to different ethno-religious groups.
Religion Unemployment Injustice Don’t know
Place of birth
North 244 (28.5%) 399 (46.6%) 83 (9.7%) 131 (15.3%)
Central 246 (44.7%) 209 (38.0%) 30 (5.5%) 65 (11.8%)
South 2468 (63.0%) 816 (20.8%) 181 (4.6%) 455 (11.6%)
Ethnic group
Hausa-Fulani 102 (15.4%) 373 (56.4%) 83 (12.6%) 103 (15.6%)
Yoruba 504 (43.3%) 381 (32.8%) 93 (8.0%) 185 (15.9%)
Igbo 1588 (70.7%) 389 (17.3%) 66 (2.9%) 202 (9.0%)
Religious group
Muslim 141 (13.2%) 602 (56.5%) 129 (12.1%) 194 (18.2%)
Christian 2772 (66.2%) 805 (19.2%) 163 (3.9%) 447 (10.7%)
Total 2958 (55.5%) 1424 (26.7%) 294 (5.5%) 651 (12.2%)
Note. The residual categories “other” were included in the analyses for the ethnic and religious groups, but this did not yield
any particular result. Therefore and because of analytical clarity, these residual groups are excluded from the table.
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million people have ﬂed their homes since the escalation of the violence in 2009 and at least
2,000 young women have been abducted since 2014.74
Boko Haram operates on the basis of the Quranic verse stating that “Anyone who is not
governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors.”75 Consequently, they
strive for an Islamic Nigeria and claim to target mostly non-indigenes and Christians. Never-
theless, their recent attacks paint a very confusing picture of their intentions. Innocent citi-
zens have been killed regardless of their religion or ethnicity. Indeed, most of their victims
turn out to be Muslim themselves.76 Notwithstanding, the repeated public advocacy to
Islamize the country could have societal consequences reaching far beyond the physical and
economic toll. Indeed, Aghedo and Osumah rightly observe that the uprising could pose a
ﬁerce challenge to Nigeria’s national unity.77 Former president Goodluck Jonathan seems to
be aware of this threat as he repeatedly tries to ensure “even those who think that the country
will be divided” in the media that “Boko Haram will not disintegrate this country.”78
Perceptions on the Consequences of the Boko Haram Insurgency
Personal and Societal Consequences of the Insurgency
In the survey, diverse statements were aimed at estimating the impact of the insurgency
on the lives of the students. Whereas students are divided on the personal consequen-
ces of the violence, they largely agree that the crisis can lead to a break-up of Nigeria.
Almost 40 percent argue that the violence does not have an impact on their personal
life or that they do not feel personally threatened. However, at the same time, another
45 percent indicate that the violence does have an impact and that they do feel threat-
ened. When asking the respondents about the impact of the violence on national unity,
almost everyone (67.7 percent) agrees that the Boko Haram crisis could lead to a
break-up of Nigeria.
The divided opinions regarding the personal consequences of the crisis can possibly be
explained by the ethno-religious background of our respondents. People from the north as
well as Hausa-Fulani and Muslims clearly indicate more often that the crisis has had an
impact on their personal lives and that they have felt more personally threatened by the vio-
lence. This is in keeping with the fact that northern towns and villages have faced more dam-
age—regardless of Boko Haram’s claim to target Christians and non-indigenes. Students
from Central-Nigeria and the Yoruba experience less impact of the crisis while students
from the South, the Igbo, and Christians suffer the least from the crisis. These differences
are signiﬁcant for all variables: F(2, 5324) D 63.785; p < .001 for the north–central–south
division; F(3, 5323) D 41.621; p < .001 for the ethnic groups; and t(1607.199) D ¡8.046;
p < .001 for the religious groups (variable 1: impact on personal life); and F(2, 5324) D
117.868; p < .001 for the north–central–south division; F(3, 5323) D 53.488; p < .001 for
the ethnic groups; and t(5251) D ¡10.810; p < .001 for the religious groups (variable 2: per-
sonally threatened).
Remarkably, when assessing whether or not the crisis can lead to a break-up of the
country, Christians—who are personally less affected by the crisis—are more strongly con-
vinced that Boko Haram poses a threat to national unity compared to Muslims; t
(1502.617) D ¡6.737; p < .001. In a similar vein, people born in the south or belonging to
the Igbo ethnic group exhibit a stronger conviction that the issue can break up the country
compared to people born in the north or belonging to the Hausa-Fulani group. People
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from central Nigeria or the Yoruba hold an in-between position. These differences are sig-
niﬁcant; F(2, 5324) D 16.169; p < .001 for the north–central–south division; F(3, 5323) D
15.433; p < .001 for the ethnic groups.
Understanding the Insurgency
Although Muslims suffer more severely from the crisis, they are also somewhat more forgiv-
ing toward Boko Haram militants. Muslims as well as students born in the north or belong-
ing to the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group agree slightly, but signiﬁcantly, more often with the
statement that militants should be offered amnesty once disarmed, in comparison with
Christians or students born in the south/central Nigeria and belonging to the Igbo/Yoruba.
These differences are signiﬁcant: t(1578.839) D ¡7.915; p < .001 for the religious groups; F
(2, 5324) D 27.681; p < .001 for the north–central–south division; and F(3, 5323) D 21.329;
p < .001 for the ethnic groups.
Additionally, Muslims understand the insurgency more given the deprivation of the area
compared to Christians—although, on average, most students disagreed with the statement
that the uprising is understandable; t(1525.811) D ¡15.977; p < .001. Likewise, students born
in the north or belonging to the Hausa-Fulani understand the crisis more compared to their
fellow students from south/central Nigeria or the Igbo/Yoruba. These differences are signiﬁ-
cant: F(2, 5324) D 77.908; p < .001 for the north–central–south division; F(3, 6323) D
108.378; p < .001 for the ethnic groups. These results alongside the ﬁnding that more north-
erners/Muslims/Hausa-Fulani see poverty as the main reason for the uprising suggest that the
same grievances mobilizing Boko Haram militants are, to some extent, also felt by students
from the same ethno-religious and spatial background who do not actively engage in violence.
Boko Haram: The Response
Aghedo and Osumah79 argue that the debate on how to respond to the insurgency has been
polarized between those who support coercive counterterrorism on the one hand and advo-
cates of conciliatory measures on the other hand. While the former group holds that force
rather than dialogue would be more effective in dealing with the organization, the latter doubts
the efﬁciency of the state security apparatus. Therefore they suggest dialogue and amnesty,
among other things. However, as the history of different violent conﬂicts in Nigeria shows, the
management of uprisings has largely been driven by coercion and a heavy-handed state secu-
rity approach. The Boko Haram crisis is no exception.80 Media seem to follow this military
answer as northern-based Nigerian paper, The Daily Trust, asked “the federal government to
please deploy troops and modern equipment to save our people.”81 Especially since 2009, the
insurgency has been tackled by ﬁerce state repression.82 Since 2009, the Nigerian military has
arrested at least 20,000 people (mostly men and boys) of whom many died during imprison-
ment.83 As a result, Boko Haram holds even more grievances vis-a-vis the national security
agencies creating a vicious cycle of violence and insecurity. The military has also been criticized
nationally and internationally for the way they have been handling the crisis. Civil society asso-
ciations have repeatedly accused the army of human rights violations and extrajudicial killings
of suspected members of the sect.84 However, it is important to note that the government—
both at a state and federal level—has made rapprochements to the Islamic militants as well.
Local citizens have also devoted attention to security and surveillance.85 Local residents from
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Maiduguri (the “capital of Boko Haram”), for instance, created the Civilian Joint Task Force to
protect their town and neighboring villages.86
Some authors—and especially journalists—take the analysis one step further by sug-
gesting policy prescriptions to tackle the crisis. While Aghedo and Osumah as well as
David et al. claim that the government needs to address the sources of socioeconomic
inequalities and human insecurity ﬁrst, Khan sees a political change as the only alterna-
tive for lasting peace and stability in Nigeria.87 In early 2015, the All Progressives Con-
gress (APC) and former General Muhammadu Buhari took over power from the
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Goodluck Jonathan. One of the promises of the
new president was a fresh strategy to tackle the insurgency including concrete military
action to build a more efﬁcient and effective coalition. He even set a December 2015
deadline to stamp out the armed group.88
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of diverse statements on the Boko Haram crisis according to
ethno-religious groups.
North Central South
Dependent variable M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Boko Haram uprising has had an impact on my personal life 3.49 (1.332) 3.09 (1.389) 2.93 (1.315)
I feel or have felt personally threatened by the Boko Haram
violence or attacks
3.53 (1.311) 3.30 (1.397) 2.80 (1.362)
The Boko Haram crisis can lead to the break-up of Nigeria 3.62 (1.368) 3.47 (1.354) 3.77 (1.200)
Boko Haram militants should be offered amnesty once they
disarm and demobilize
2.80 (1.421) 2.58 (1.405) 2.43 (1.310)
Given the deprivation in the North, the Boko Haram uprising is
understandable
2.61 (1.308) 2.38 (1.187) 2.08 (1.127)
Boko Haram can only be stopped militarily 3.52 (1.283) 3.37 (1.317) 3.27 (1.240)
Boko Haram will be defeated permanently within the next year 3.82 (1.081) 3.47 (1.087) 3.12 (1.066)
Hausa-Fulani Yoruba Igbo
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Boko Haram uprising has had an impact on my personal life 3.55 (1.328) 2.91 (1.279) 3.07 (1.320)
I feel or have felt personally threatened by the Boko Haram
violence or attacks
3.56 (1.296) 2.75 (1.318) 2.89 (1.387)
The Boko Haram crisis can lead to the break-up of Nigeria 3.55 (1.407) 3.63 (1.189) 3.84 (1.187)
Boko Haram militants should be offered amnesty once they
disarm and demobilize
2.87 (1.429) 2.52 (1.275) 2.40 (1.334)
Given the deprivation in the North, the Boko Haram uprising is
understandable
2.82 (1.306) 2.37 (1.147) 1.97 (1.107)
Boko Haram can only be stopped militarily 3.61 (1.269) 3.34 (1.177) 3.25 (1.262)
Boko Haram will be defeated permanently within the next year 4.02 (1.011) 3.34 (1.008) 3.10 (1.070)
Muslim Christian
M (SD) M (SD)
Boko Haram uprising has had an impact on my personal life 3.36 (1.367) 2.97 (1.322)
I feel or have felt personally threatened by the Boko Haram
violence or attacks
3.38 (1.363) 2.87 (1.374)
The Boko Haram crisis can lead to the break-up of Nigeria 3.47 (1.378) 3.78 (1.202)
Boko Haram militants should be offered amnesty once they
disarm and demobilize
2.80 (1.402) 2.43 (1.320)
Given the deprivation in the North, the Boko Haram uprising is
understandable
2.73 (1.257) 2.06 (1.123)
Boko Haram can only be stopped militarily 3.54 (1.240) 3.26 (1.254)
Boko Haram will be defeated permanently within the next year 3.84 (1.053) 3.14 (1.064)
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On average, students tend to support the military counterterrorism strategy the government
is applying, but it is clear that students born in the north tend to hold different opinions
compared with the ones born in the south. People from the north share a stronger belief in a
military solution compared to people born in central and south Nigeria; F(2, 5324) D
14.323, p < .001. In a similar vein, Muslims and Hausa-Fulani agree more often that Boko
Haram can only be stopped militarily compared to Christians and people belonging to the
Igbo or Yoruba group; t(5251) D ¡6.603; p < .001 for religious groups and F(3, 5323) D
15.761; p < .001 for ethnic groups.
Moreover, students born in the north as well as Hausa-Fulani and Muslims have more
conﬁdence in the new president—and Muslim—Muhammadu Buhari and his military
action plan as they agree more often that Boko Haram will be defeated permanently within
the next year. In contrast, students from the south, Igbo, and Christians have less conﬁ-
dence in the new president and in a military solution. These differences are signiﬁcant: F
(2, 5324) D 160.636; p < .001 for the place of birth; F(3, 5323) D 137.973; p < .001 for
the ethnic groups; and t(1650.126) D ¡18.847; p < .001 for the religious groups.
Conclusion: Laying Bare Fault lines
While the Buhari administration is intensifying its military campaign against the activities of
Boko Haram, scholars are trying to unravel as many aspects of the insurgency as possible
because they agree that one must understand the problem in order to solve it properly.
Those articles, mainly oriented toward policymaking, are largely qualitative and narrative in
nature. Besides academic information, other available sources on Boko Haram include state-
ments (mainly of politicians) in news reports. Quantitative, empirical information on public
perceptions vis-a-vis Boko Haram remains scarce. This study used the Corpers’ Survey con-
ducted in ﬁve Nigerian universities in 2015 because it offered some of the most recent and
extensive data to scrutinize Nigerians’ perceptions on Boko Haram. Students were asked
about the main reason behind the sect’s uprising, the personal and societal impact of the vio-
lence, and the military solution the government is applying. This empirical study yielded
several results.
First, if explaining the purpose and philosophy behind Boko Haram is challenging, it is
possibly even more so because the Nigerian populace seems to ﬁlter its explanations for the
crisis through ethnoreligious prisms. In general, most students tend to interpret the Boko
Haram uprising as a religious crisis—although scholars warn that Boko Haram’s active advo-
cacy for a strict implementation of Sharia law conceals its “socio-economic and political
fac¸ade.”89 However, important differences are noted when looking at the ethno-religious
and spatial background of the students. People born in the south, belonging to the Igbo eth-
nic group, or Christians are signiﬁcantly more likely to link the crisis with religious extrem-
ism. In other words, they are more likely to perceive Boko Haram as a “planned Islamic
jihad against Christians in Nigeria.”90 Muslim people (frequently but not exclusively belong-
ing to the Hausa-Fulani group and born in the north), on the other hand, tend to argue
more often that unemployment and poverty have caused the uprising. Moreover, they are
also the only ones who sometimes indicate that a sense of injustice and the neglect of the
northern regions could be a possible cause. People born in central Nigeria or from the
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Yoruba group hold an in-between position, although they slightly lean more toward the
opinions of southern people. These results indicate that the problems of northern Nigeria
such as poverty, unemployment, and social injustice are shared within the larger Muslim
community. This is not surprising given that northern Nigeria remains the most underdevel-
oped part of the country up until today [March 2016]. This situation can further foster griev-
ances, possibly spurring extremist tendencies in northern Nigeria.
Second, although the conﬂict is to blame for over 20,000 deaths, the crisis did not
have an extremely big impact on the personal lives of most students. However, it is clear
that—notwithstanding Boko Haram’s explicit claim to target Christians—Muslims are
considerably more affected by the violence and they feel more threatened. In this respect,
it is intriguing to note that Muslims are also more lenient toward the Boko Haram mili-
tancy: they are slightly more willing to grant amnesty to disarmed Boko Haram militants
and they understand the insurgency better given the deprivation of the north. Coupled
with the ﬁnding that they perceive the Boko Haram crisis more often as an outcome of
poverty and unemployment, we conclude that the grievances mobilizing Boko Haram
are also felt by students from the same background. Interestingly, however, students
from this background (i.e., Muslim, Hausa-Fulani, or born in the north), are less con-
vinced that the conﬂict can lead to a breakup of the country. On the contrary, their
Christian counterparts are more afraid that the Boko Haram crisis will disintegrate the
country—a result that can be interpreted in line with their conviction that Boko Haram
is mainly a religious (Muslim) threat.
Third, the state is mainly waging war against the terrorist group. Muslim Hausa-Fulani
students born in the north are more strongly convinced that this is the right strategy and
they agree more often with President Buhari that the militants will be defeated permanently
within one year [2015] compared to their southern counterparts. In other words, they seem
to have more conﬁdence in president Muhammadu Buhari who happens to be a Muslim
and a northerner, but also a former general. However, as our previous conclusion indicates,
the presence of economic grievances among students from northern Nigeria and Muslims
suggests that the government should equally address the economic deprivation of the north
in order to address the longstanding grievances.
In line with Olaniyan and Asuelime91 and with Onapajo and Usman,92 we argue that it is
possible that the impact of the Boko Haram crisis goes beyond the direct physical and eco-
nomic impact as it divides people’s thoughts on the issue. Perceptions on the insurgency
across Nigeria’s disparate nationalities reveal the centrality of “ethno-religious thinking.”
This has been deﬁned by Olaniyan and Asuelime93 as “Nigerians’ reading of ethnic and reli-
gious meanings into most actions in the country”; and Nigerian students clearly read the
Boko Haram crisis through such ethno-religious glasses. Public opinion—at least the one
held by Nigerian students—is polarized over Boko Haram’s agenda, consequences, and solu-
tions; and these polarized perceptions reﬂect long-standing grievances. Based on our study,
we therefore conclude that Boko Haram painfully lays bare Nigeria’s ethno-religious clea-
vages, possibly undermining efforts at nation-building. Because interpretations of the crisis
exhibit these frames, it is not unlikely that the crisis has led to a stronger north–south divide
and a derogation of inter-group relations. Ethno-religious thinking can, in turn, reinforce
the societal divides used to explain the differences in interpretations. In other words: does
Boko Haram fuel the ﬂames? While this question falls out of the scope of this cross-sectional
study, it nonetheless forms an interesting angle for future, longitudinal, and more nationally
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representative research aimed at establishing Boko Haram’s impact on Nigeria’s north–south
divide in more detail.
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Appendix A. Dependent variables and their descriptives (N D 5,327).
Question n %
Boko Haram has had an impact on my personal life (M D 3.04; SD D 1.341)
1 D disagree completely 979 18.4
2 D disagree 1,007 18.9
3 D neither agree, nor disagree 927 17.4
4 D agree 1,666 31.3
5 D agree completely 748 14.0
I feel/have felt personally threatened by the Boko Haram violence (M D 2.97; SD D 1.387)
1 D disagree completely 1,105 20.7
2 D disagree 1,099 20.6
3 D neither agree, nor disagree 748 14.0
4 D agree 1,588 29.8
5 D agree completely 787 14.8
The Boko Haram crisis can lead to the break-up of Nigeria (M D 3.71; SD D 1.249)
1 D disagree completely 416 7.8
2 D disagree 672 12.6
3 D neither agree, nor disagree 630 11.8
4 D agree 1,924 36.1
5 D agree completely 1,685 31.6
The Boko Haram militants should be offered amnesty once they disarm and demobilize (M D 2.50; SD D 1.345)
1 D disagree completely 1,704 32.0
2 D disagree 1,215 22.8
3 D neither agree, nor disagree 890 16.7
4 D agree 1,053 19.8
5 D agree completely 465 8.7
Given the deprivation in the north, the Boko Haram uprising is understandable (M D 2.20; SD D 1.181)
1 D disagree completely 1,897 35.6
2 D disagree 1,611 30.2
3 D neither agree, nor disagree 932 17.5
4 D agree 635 11.9
5 D agree completely 252 4.7
Boko Haram can only be stopped militarily (M D 3.32; SD D 1.258)
1 D disagree completely 464 8.7
2 D disagree 1,047 19.7
3 D neither agree, nor disagree 1,352 25.4
4 D agree 1,265 23.7
5 D agree completely 1,199 22.5
Boko Haram will be defeated permanently within the next year (M D 3.27; SD D 1.103)
1 D disagree completely 411 7.7
2 D disagree 600 11.3
3 D neither agree, nor disagree 2,322 43.6
4 D agree 1,117 21.0
5 D agree completely 877 16.5
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Appendix B. Sociodemographic variables and their descriptives (N D 6,830).
Frequency Percentage
University
UNN Nsukka 1,561 22.9
Univ. of Abuja 1,085 15.9
Univ. of Lagos 1,235 18.1
UDU Sokoto 1,286 18.8
Univ. of Port Harcourt 1,663 24.3








Other/No religion 1,01 1.5
Total valid 6,712 98.3
Place of birth
North 1,248 18.3
North-East zone 119 1.7
North-West zone 1,129 16.5
Central 711 10.4
North-Central zone 711 10.4
South 4,819 70.6
South-East zone 1,630 23.9
South-South zone 1,376 20.1
South-West zone 1,813 26.5
Not in Nigeria 29 0.4






Total valid 6,745 98.8
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